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[Shame]	  is	  the	  representation	  we	  form	  of	  ourselves	  as	  diminished	  beings	  with	  which	  
we	   are	   pained	   to	   identify.	   Yet	   shame’s	   whole	   intensity…	   consists	   precisely	   in	   our	  
inability	   not	   to	   identify	   with	   this	   being	   who	   is	   already	   foreign	   to	   us	   and	   whose	  
motives	  for	  acting	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  comprehend…	  It	   is	  that	  one	  seeks	  to	  hide	  from	  
the	  others,	  but	  also	  from	  oneself…	  What	  appears	  in	  shame	  is	  thus	  precisely	  the	  fact	  
of	   being	   riveted	   to	  oneself,	   the	   radical	   impossibility	   of	   fleeing	  oneself	   to	  hide	   from	  
oneself,	  the	  unalterably	  binding	  presence	  of	  the	  I	  to	  itself.	  	  
Emmanuel	  Lévinas,	  On	  Escape1	  	  
	  
Abstract	  
In	   Shame	   and	   Necessity,	   his	   brilliant	   book	   on	   the	   ethics	   of	   the	   Ancient	   Greeks,	  
Bernard	  Williams	  performed	  a	  detailed	  and	  intriguing	  analysis	  of	  an	  emotion	  that,	  
up	  to	  then,	  had	  been	  given	  little	  merit	   in	  connection	  to	  morality.	  Arguing	  with	  his	  
former	   professor,	   E.	   R.	   Dodds,	   and	   picking	   up	   on	   a	   distinction	   between	   “shame	  
cultures”	   and	   “guilt	   cultures”	   drawn	   by	   American	   anthropologist	   Ruth	   Benedict,	  
Williams	   contended	   that	   some	   features	   of	   shame	   allow	  us	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   our	  
ethical	  outlook	  in	  deeper	  and	  more	  meaningful	  ways	  than	  guilt,	  which	  is	  assumed	  
to	   be	   the	   “superior”	   moral	   emotion.	   Interestingly,	   in	   William’s	   view,	   this	   is	   so	  
because	  of	   the	   special	   link	  between	  ethical	   judgement	  and	  personal	   identity	   that	  
underlies	   shame.	   This	   paper	   will	   focus	   on	   personal	   identity	   issues	   connected	   to	  
shame.	  Taking	  a	  narrative	  theory	  of	  identity	  as	  the	  starting	  point,	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  
in	  shame	  the	  ongoing	  narrative	  breaks	  down	  and	  a	  reassessment	  of	  the	  self	  takes	  
place.	   Shame	   is	   taken	   here	   to	   be	   a	   place	  where	   the	   narrator	   becomes	   aware	   of	  
inconsistencies	  and	  of	  the	  impossibility	  to	  establish	  one	  “final,	  authentic”	  version	  of	  
her	  self.	  Crucially,	  this	  re-­‐evaluation	  is	  triggered	  by	  a	  consciousness	  of	  the	  gaze	  of	  
others	   upon	   us,	   which	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   social	   relations	   both	   to	   our	  
sense	   of	   self	   and,	   of	   course,	   to	   morality.	   The	   phenomenology	   of	   shame,	   its	  
intentional	  objects	  and	  the	  way	  we	  interpret	  them	  all	  point	  toward	  the	  notion	  that	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the	  self	  can	  best	  be	  conceived	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  work	  in	  progress	  where	  others	  have	  an	  
impact	  and	  a	  say.	  
	  
Some	  preliminary	  remarks	  
This	   paper	   starts	   with	   a	   quotation	   from	   Emmanuel	   Lévinas,	   a	   thinker	   who,	   in	   terms	   of	  
philosophical	  style,	  approach	  and	  tradition,	  has	  very	  little	  in	  common	  with	  the	  philosopher	  
who	   prompted	  my	   own	   reflections	   on	   shame,	   and	  whose	  work	   is	   the	  main	   focus	   of	   this	  
paper,	  Bernard	  Williams.	  The	  title	  also	  comes	  from	  the	  Lévinas	  quote.	  Why	  put	  my	  thoughts	  
on	   Williams	   under	   such	   a	   heading?	   The	   main	   reason	   is	   that,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   Lévinas’	  
metaphor	  of	  “being	  riveted	  to	  oneself”	  beautifully	  captures	  the	  fundamental	  tension	  within	  
the	  self	   that	   I	  wish	   to	  explore	  here:	   roughly,	   the	  discrepancy	  between	  what	  we	  are	   (what	  
can’t	   help	   being)	   and	   what	   we	   would	   like	   to	   be.	   This,	   in	   my	   view,	   can	   be	   a	   destructive	  
tension,	  but	  also	  a	  productive	  one,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  we	  conceive	  identity	  and	  how	  we	  
conceive	  morality.	  Williams’	  account	  of	  shame	  is	  a	  detailed	  exploration	  of	  that	  tension	  and	  
his	  views	  match	  in	  many	  respects	  Lévinas’,	  so	  to	  speak,	  more	  poetically	  expressed	  intuitions;	  
hence	   the	   title.	   Having	   said	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   explore	   these	   questions	  more	   deeply,	   first	   I	  
would	   like	   to	   take	   a	   look	   at	  Williams’	   account	   of	   shame,	   and	   how	   it	   compares	   to	   other	  
accounts	   in	   recent	   (and	  not	   so	   recent)	   literature.	   I	  will	   then	  draw	   some	   conclusions	   for	   a	  
narrative	  model	  of	  personal	  identity	  and	  hint	  at	  some	  moral	  implications.	  	  
But	   before	   I	   go	   into	   this,	   I’d	   like	   to	   very	   briefly	   say	   something	   about	   the	   current	  
philosophical	   debate	   on	   emotions.	   After	   a	   few	   decades	   of	   lively	   discussion,	   analytic	  
philosophers	   of	   emotion	   have	   divided,	   roughly,	   into	   three	   main	   currents:	   cognitivists	  
(among	   them	   Robert	   Solomon	   and	   Martha	   Nussbaum),	   who	   think	   about	   emotions	   as	  
judgements,	   with	   cognitive	   content;	   neo-­‐Jamesian	   feeling	   theorists	   (like	   Jesse	   Prinz	   or	  
Jenefer	  Robinson),	  who	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  feeling	  and	  non-­‐cognitive	  elements,	  which	  
for	   them	   are	   the	   essential	   ones;	   and	   perceptual	   theorists	   (such	   a	   Ronald	   de	   Sousa	   and	  
Amélie	  Rorty),	  who	  conceptualise	  emotions	  as	  ways	  of	  “seeing	  as”,	  seeing	  the	  world	  under	  a	  
certain	   aspect,	   or	   according	   to	  a	   certain	  pattern	  of	   salience	   that	  highlights	   some	   features	  
rather	   that	   others.	   All	   positions	   offer	   useful	   insights	   on	   emotion	   and	   are	   vulnerable	   to	  
powerful	  objections.	  Probably,	   for	  a	  wider	  consensus	  to	  arise,	   further	  scientific	   input	  from	  
psychology	   and	   neurophysiology	  will	   be	   needed,	   as	   the	   current	   studies	   available	   are	   still	  
sketchy	  and	  inconclusive.	  Some	  authors	  have	  even	  defended	  that	  “emotion”	  is	  not	  a	  natural	  
kind,	  and	   therefore	  not	  a	  productive	   category	   for	   scientific	   study	   (see,	   for	  an	  outstanding	  
example,	  Griffiths	  1997).	  	  
I	  have	  to	  admit	  that	  my	  own	  position	  on	  this	  question	  of	  what	  emotions	  are	  is	  not	  very	  well	  
defined,	  partially	  because	  my	  aim	  has	  never	  been	  to	  come	  up	  with	  an	  account	  of	  emotion	  in	  
general.	   I	  am	  much	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  cultural	  and	  cognitive	  aspects	  of	  one	  particular	  
emotion,	   namely	   shame,	  which	   in	  my	  opinion	  brings	   to	   light	   fundamental	   features	  of	   the	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way	   we	   think	   about	   ourselves.	   My	   analysis	   is	   driven	   by	   an	   interest	   in	   personal	   identity,	  
subjectivity	  and	  agency,	  in	  the	  assumptions	  that	  underlie	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  try	  to	  make	  
sense	  of	  our	  (in	  this	  case,	  emotional)	  life.	  A	  phenomenological	  study	  is	  therefore	  crucial	  and	  
many	  of	  my	  views	  are	  sympathetic	  with	  those	  advocated	  by	  cognitivists,	  because	  many	  of	  
the	   aspects	   they	   stress	   are	   essential	   to	   my	   analysis.	   However,	   I	   wouldn’t	   want	   to	   be	  
interpreted	  as	  saying,	   for	   instance,	   that	  emotions	  are	  merely	  special	  kinds	  of	   judgements;	  
rather,	   their	   cultural,	   cognitive	   and	   phenomenological	   dimensions	   are	   what,	   on	   a	   first	  
approach,	  I	  find	  more	  interesting	  about	  them.	  
This	  approach	  presents	  a	  challenge,	  which	  due	  to	  my	  main	  references	  is	  particularly	  visible	  
and	   particularly	   pressing:	   complex	   emotions	   of	   self-­‐assessment2	  like	   shame	   carry	   a	   heavy	  
cultural	   bias.	   Bernard	   Williams	   analysed	   shame	   drawing	   on	   Ancient	   Greek	   texts,	   but	   he	  
himself	  recognises	  that	  the	  world	  and	  our	  ideas	  of	  it	  and	  of	  us	  as	  persons	  and	  agents	  have	  
changed	  immensely	  since	  the	  times	  of	  Homer	  or	  Sophocles.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  
shame	  has	  varied	  historically	  and	  varies	  widely	  from	  one	  culture	  to	  another,	  particularly,	  but	  
not	   only,	   regarding	   its	   substantive	   content:	   namely,	   the	   situations	   and	   things	   we	   deem	  
shameful.	  Aidos	  in	  Ancient	  Greece,	  an	  honour	  culture,	  was	  not	  the	  same	  as	  modern	  shame.	  
Spanish	  vergüenza	  has	  not	   the	  exact	   same	  definition	  as	  English	   shame3,	  or	   as	   the	   related	  
emotions	   described	   by	   Ruth	   Benedict	   (Benedict,	   1946/2005)	   in	   her	   study	   of	   Japan	   in	   the	  
1940s.	  Spanish	  vergüenza	   is	  not	  identical	  now	  to	  what	  it	  was	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Calderón	  de	  la	  
Barca.	  However,	   translations	  work	   somehow,	  and	   the	   fact	   that,	   to	   a	   great	   extent,	  we	  are	  
able	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  being	  meant	  seems	  to	  indicate	  there	  is	  some	  common	  ground.4	  I	  
believe	  —but	   this	  belief	   is	  more	   like	  a	  hope	  based	  on	   the	  abovementioned	   fact	  of	  partial	  
translatability5—	  that	  this	  common	  ground	  is	  sufficient	  to	  enable	  a	  study	  of	  shame	  and	  the	  
underlying	  structures	  of	  the	  self	  that	  can	  reflect,	  at	   least,	  some	  essential	   facts	  about	  most	  
Western	  societies.	  
	  
Bernard	  Williams’	  account	  of	  (Ancient	  Greek)	  shame	  
Bernard	   Williams’	   Shame	   and	   Necessity	   is	   not	   an	   ordinary	   book	   on	   the	   philosophy	   of	  
emotion:	   the	  analysis	   of	   shame	   that	   it	   presents	   isn’t	  motivated	  by	   a	  particular	   interest	   in	  
that	  emotion	  as	  such,	  or	  in	  moral	  emotions	  in	  general,	  for	  that	  matter.	  So	  when	  taking	  it	  as	  
a	  starting	  point	  for	  a	  study	  of	  shame,	  one	  has	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  a	  few	  facts	  about	  its	  aims	  and	  
its	  production.	  Shame	  and	  Necessity	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  series	  of	  talks	  given	  by	  Williams	  at	  the	  
Department	  of	  Classics	  in	  Berkeley	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1989.	  Being	  a	  moral	  philosopher,	  a	  critic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This	  term	  is	  taken	  from	  Gabriele	  Taylor’s	  famous	  study:	  Taylor,	  G.	  (1985).	  Pride,	  Shame	  and	  Guilt:	  Emotions	  of	  
Self-­‐Assessment.	  Oxford:	  Claredon	  Press.	  
3	  A	  crucial	  difference,	  whose	  detailed	  implications	  I’m	  not	  going	  to	  draw	  here,	  is	  that,	  in	  Spanish,	  there	  is	  only	  
one	  word	  for	  both	  shame	  and	  embarrassment.	  
4	  In	   this	   respect,	   see	  Bernard	  Williams’	   (1993)	  considerations	  about	   the	   relations	  between	  shame	  and	  aidos,	  
p.	  88.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  all	  my	  sources	  are	  Western	  authors.	  
5	  Arguably,	  translatability	  is	  always	  partial.	  
	   4	  
of	  Kantian	  morality,	   and	   in	   love	  with	  Greek	   classics	   such	  as	  Homer	  and	  Sophocles,	  whose	  
moral	  world	  he	  felt	  had	  been	  grossly	  misinterpreted	  by	  critics,	  he	  decided	  to	  focus	  his	  talks	  
precisely	  on	  that	  world	  and	  those	  critics.	  The	  book	  starts,	   then,	  as	  an	  attempt	   to	   free	   the	  
Greeks	  from	  prejudiced	  interpretations	  of	  them,	  and	  consequently	  finds	  itself	  drawn	  into	  a	  
detailed	  discussion	  of	  shame	  as	  the	  main	  moral	  emotion	  in	  their	  culture.6	  
In	  this	  connection,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  Williams	  is	  not	  (only,	  nor	  mainly)	  
aiming	   at	   a	   historically	   accurate	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   ethical	   outlook	   of	   the	   Greeks,	  
although	  the	  force	  of	  many	  of	  his	  arguments	  comes	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  
making	   a	   determined	   effort7 	  at	   approaching	   the	   maximum	   of	   accuracy	   in	   that	   sense.	  
However,	   the	   reason	   Williams	   felt	   an	   urge	   to	   free	   the	   Greeks	   from	   deforming	  
interpretations	  was	  in	  the	  first	  place	  that	  he	  genuinely	  responded	  to	  those	  texts	  in	  and	  from	  
his	  own	  present,	  not	  as	  an	  exercise	  of	  “imaginative	  time-­‐travel”	  (Williams,	  1993,	  p.	  18).	  The	  
reason	  is	  that	  he	  was	  convinced	  that	  we,	  modern	  Westerners,	  are	  able	  to	  genuinely	  respond	  
to	  many	  texts	  and	  cultural	  products	  of	  Ancient	  Greece,	   in	  and	  from	  our	  present,	  and	  they	  
are	  still	  relevant	  to	  us	  because	  they	  have	  a	  real	  influence	  on	  us	  now.8	  He	  quotes	  and	  makes	  
his	   own	   a	   remark	   taken	   from	   the	   final	   section	   of	   the	   Preface	   to	   the	   second	   essay	   of	  
Nietzsche’s	  Unmodern	  Observations9:	  	  
I	  cannot	  imagine	  what	  would	  be	  the	  meaning	  of	  classical	  philology	  in	  our	  own	  age,	  if	  it	  is	  not	  
to	  be	  untimely—that	  is,	  to	  act	  against	  the	  age,	  and	  by	  so	  doing,	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  age,	  
and,	  let	  us	  hope,	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  future	  age.	  (Williams,	  1993,	  p.	  4)	  
So	  Williams’	  aim	   in	  analysing	  the	  ethics	  of	   the	  Ancient	  Greeks	   is	   to	  make	  their	  notions	  do	  
their	   untimely	  work	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   present,	   to	   help	   us	   better	   understand	   ourselves,	   to	  
confront	  us	  with	   forms	  of	  existence	  that	  are	   indeed	  different,	  but	  potentially	   illuminating.	  
Our	  failure	  to	  interpret	  them	  correctly	  entails	  a	  parallel	  error	  in	  our	  self-­‐image.	  That	  is	  why	  I	  
think	   it	   legitimate	  to	  bring	  to	  bear	  Williams’	   intuitions	  about	  Greek	  shame	  on	  our	  modern	  
conception	   of	   it:	   modern	   shame	   is	   never	   far	   away	   from	   his	   concerns,	   and	   it	   plays	   an	  
important	  contrastive	  role	  in	  his	  study.	  There	  is	  something	  to	  learn	  about	  shame	  today	  from	  
Sophocles’	  Ajax,	  however	  strange	  that	  may	  seem.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  idea	  that	  shame	  was	  the	  central	  moral	  emotion	  in	  Ancient	  Greece	  is	  not	  Williams’,	  he	  takes	  it	  from	  his	  
former	  professor	  E.	  R.	  Dodds	  (1951),	  with	  whom	  he	  argues	  throughout	  the	  book.	  Dodds	  himself	  came	  upon	  it	  
by	   applying	   to	   the	   Greeks	   some	   concepts	   of	   the	   anthropological	   outlook	   developed	   by	   Ruth	   Benedict	  
(1946/2005),	  namely	  the	  distinction	  between	  “shame	  cultures”	  and	  “guilt	  cultures”,	  which	  I	  briefly	  summarise	  
below.	  
7	  And	  I	  dare	  say	  succeeding	  as	  well;	  but	  not	  being	  a	  classical	  scholar,	  I	  can	  be	  no	  authorised	  judge	  for	  that.	  
8	  For	  Williams’	  ideas	  on	  how	  and	  why	  to	  read	  the	  classics	  see	  Williams	  (1993),	  ch.	  1,	  esp.	  pp.	  18-­‐20.	  
9	  Williams	  quotes	   the	  Unzeitgemäße	  Betrachtungen	   from	  a	  1990	  edition	  by	  William	  Arrowsmith,	  who	   chose	  
this	   title	   instead	  of	   the	  more	  usual	   translation	  Untimely	  Meditations.	  Williams,	   however,	   replaces	   the	  word	  
“unmodern”	  with	   “untimely”	   in	   the	  quotation,	   for	   reasons	   that	  he	  explains	   at	  Williams	   (1993),	   p.	   170,	  n.	   6.	  
Here	  I	  quote	  his	  modified	  quotation.	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His	   attacks	   are	   aimed	   at	   those	   he	   labels	   “progressivists”10	  and	   their	   Cartesian-­‐Kantian	  
notions	   of	   the	   self	   and	   morality.	   The	   readings	   they	   make	   are	   clearly	   shaped	   by	   their	  
prejudices:	   soul-­‐body	   dualism,	   Neokantian	   views	   on	   morality	   (with	   their	   implications	   of	  
abstract	   rationality,	   autonomy,	  duty,	  universalism	  and	  altruism),	   and	  a	  Hegelian	  notion	  of	  
history	  as	  progress.	  The	  Ancient	  Greeks	  didn’t	  generally	  entertain	  such	  notions,	  or	  they	  did	  
only	  to	  a	  small	  extent	  and	  in	  a	  different	  shape,	  therefore	  they	  were,	  morally	  and	  culturally,	  a	  
childish	  and	   immature	  people.	  Williams	   radically	  disagrees	  with	   those	  views.	  For	  him,	  any	  
account	  that	  takes	  Achilles,	  Priam	  or	  Odysseus	  as	  immature	  children	  is	  obviously	  incorrect,	  
and	  he	  intends	  to	  show	  why	  and	  how	  by	  bringing	  to	   light	  the	  main	  advantages	  he	  finds	   in	  
the	  ethical	  outlook	  of	  the	  Greeks.	  It	  is	  at	  this	  point	  where	  his	  analysis	  of	  shame	  comes	  to	  the	  
fore.	  
As	  I	  remarked	  earlier,	  according	  to	  a	  very	  influential	  –and	  disputed–	  anthropological	  model,	  
human	   cultures,	   and	   the	   ethical	   ideas	   they	   entail,	   can	   be	   split	   into	   “shame	   cultures”	   and	  
“guilt	   cultures”.11	  Both	   would	   therefore	   be	   basic	   attitudes	   with	   the	   power	   to	   ethically	  
articulate	   societies.	   The	   first	   versions	   of	   this	   theory	   assumed	   that	   the	   structures	   of	   guilt	  
were	  morally	  superior,	  better,	  more	  mature:	  shame	  would	  be	  heteronomous	  and	  egoistic,	  
while	  guilt	  would	  be	  autonomous	  and	  altruistic.	  Shame	  would	  be	  egoistic	  because	  it	  refers	  
always	   mainly	   to	   oneself,	   and	   heteronomous	   because	   the	   values	   against	   which	   the	   self	  
measures	   herself	   are	   external;	   they	   are	   always	   connected	   to	   the	   opinions	   of	   others,	   to	  
appearances.	   Guilt,	   however,	   would	   be	   altruistic,	   because	   it	   orients	   us	   towards	   others,	  
towards	  the	  reparation	  of	  a	  damage	  inflicted,	  and	  autonomous,	  because	  it	  doesn’t	  depend	  
on	  public	  opinion:	  transgressions	  of	  our	  moral	  duty	  are	  not	  affected,	  or	  erased	  or	  lightened	  
by	  the	  circumstance	  that	  nobody	  other	  than	  ourselves	  knows	  what	  we	  did.	  	  
But	  let	  us	  turn	  now	  to	  Williams’	  account	  of	  shame,	  which	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
culture	  and	  ethics	  of	   the	  Greeks.	  The	  original	  experience	  associated	  with	  shame	   is	   that	  of	  
being	  seen	  in	  the	  wrong	  circumstances	  by	  the	  wrong	  people,	  and	  more	  precisely,	  leaving	  the	  
naked	   body	   exposed	   to	   the	   gaze	   of	   others.	   The	   immediate	   reaction	   it	   triggers	   is	   that	   of	  
covering	  yourself,	  hiding	  or	  escaping	  (Williams,	  1993,	  p.	  78).	  This	  is	   illustrated	  by	  Williams’	  
examples,	   such	   as	   Odysseus’	   shame	   at	   the	   thought	   of	   being	   seen	   naked	   by	   Nausikaa	  
(Williams	  1993,	  p.	  78,	  n.	  10).12	  But	  in	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  tradition,	  in	  Genesis,	  shame	  is	  also	  
discovered	  in	  this	  way,	  when	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  eat	  the	  forbidden	  fruit,	  realise	  they	  are	  naked,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Prominent	   among	   them	   is	   Bruno	   Snell	   and	   his	   Die	   Entdeckung	   des	   Geistes	   (1948).	   While	   Snell’s	   most	  
provocative	  and	  radical	  remarks	  have	  not	  always	  been	  endorsed,	  milder	  versions	  of	  his	  ideas	  that	  the	  Ancient	  
Greeks	  were	  not	  full	  agents	  and	  had	  no	  complete	  concept	  of	  the	  will	  have	  influenced	  many	  authors	  and	  can	  
even	  be	  found	  nowadays	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Peter	  Sloterdijk’s	  (2006)	  Zorn	  und	  Zeit).	  Dodds’	  (1951)	  views	  also	  
come	  under	  criticism,	  but	  of	  a	  much	  more	  sympathetic	  kind.	  William’s	  basis	  of	  agreement	  with	  Dodds	  is	  much	  
wider.	  
11	  This	   distinction	   was	   first	   introduced	   by	   Benedict	   (1946/2005).	   Upon	   this	   distinction	   is	   based	   one	   of	   the	  
classical	  studies	  of	  Ancient	  Greek	  morality	  and	  culture	  that	  largely	  inspired	  Williams	  to	  write	  his:	  Dodds,	  E.	  R.	  
(1951).	  
12	  Odysseus	  naked:	  Od.	  6.221-­‐22.	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cover	   themselves	  with	   leaves	   and	   run	   to	   hide.13	  Starting	   from	   this	   paradigm,	   shame	   later	  
extends	  to	  other	  situations	  where	  we	  feel	  ridiculous,	  diminished	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  another	  or	  in	  
an	  inferior	  position:	  tripping	  clumsily	  in	  the	  street,	  speaking	  in	  public	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
While	   the	   link	   with	   nakedness	   as	   a	   paradigm	   of	   vulnerability	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   an	  
observer	   are,	   according	   to	  Williams,	   key	   features	   of	   the	   basic	   experience	   of	   shame,	   if	   it	  
didn’t	   go	   further,	   shame	  would	  be	  no	  more	   than	   a	  quasi-­‐automatic	   defensive	   reaction,	   it	  
wouldn’t	  be	  so	   important	   for	   the	  self	  and	   for	  morality.	   It	  would	  be	  so	  anecdotic,	   intimate	  
and	  private	  that	  it	  wouldn’t	  be	  capable	  of	  shaping	  any	  common	  ground;	  there	  would	  be	  no	  
room	  for	  even	  thinking	  of	  a	  “shame	  culture”	  (Williams	  1993,	  pp.	  219-­‐223).	  But	  shame	  also	  
appears	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  observers,	  although	  retaining	  the	  link	  to	  the	  gaze	  of	  others.	  Such	  
was	   the	   case,	   for	   instance,	   for	   Anna	   Karenina,	   alone	   in	   the	   train	   from	   Moscow	   to	   St.	  
Petersburg,	  not	  daring	  to	  admit,	  even	  to	  herself,	   that	  she	  had	   fallen	   in	   love	  with	  Vronksy;	  
such	  was	  Phaedra’s	  case,	  even	  before	  the	  nurse	  had	  told	  Phaedra’s	  stepson	  Hippolytus	  of	  
her	   passion	   for	   him. 14 	  But,	   moreover,	   shame	   is	   often	   felt	   retrospectively,	   when	   we	  
remember	   situations	   that,	   at	   the	   time	   and	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   witnesses,	   may	   not	   have	  
seemed	   particularly	   discomforting.	   And	   even	   if	   they	   did,	   retrospective	   shame	   is	   never	  
remembered	  shame15,	  as	  it	  might	  be	  the	  case	  of	  other	  emotions;	  retrospective	  shame	  is	  real	  
shame,	  felt	  with	  full	  intensity	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  remembering	  it:	  it’s	  not	  the	  reminiscence	  of	  
an	  emotion,	  but	  the	  emotion	  itself.	  
If	   the	   gaze	   of	   another	   is	   essential	   —and	   for	   Williams,	   it	   is—	   and,	   nevertheless,	   we	   can	  
experience	  shame	  with	  full	  intensity	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  witnesses,	  and	  even	  after	  the	  events	  
have	  taken	  place,	  we	  feel	  shame,	  then,	  in	  front	  of	  an	  internalised	  observer.	  That	  idea	  may	  
seem	  strange	  with	  just	  nakedness	  in	  mind.	  But,	  for	  Williams,	  nakedness	  is	  only	  the	  powerful	  
and	  vivid	  paradigm	  of	  a	  more	  general	  situation	  (Williams	  1993,	  p.	  220):	  that	  of	  loss	  of	  power	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  another,	  of	  finding	  oneself	  in	  a	  position	  of	  inferiority,	  exposed,	  vulnerable.	  But	  
who	  is	  this	  other	  who	  looks	  at	  us	  from	  within	  ourselves?	  Any	  observer	  would	  do?	  
Williams	   explores	   different	   possibilities,	   and	   the	   first	   obvious	   fact	   seems	   to	   be	   that	   the	  
internalised	  observer	  before	  whom	  we	  feel	  ashamed	  is	  not	  just	  anyone:	  Shame	  need	  not	  be	  
just	  a	  matter	  of	  being	  seen,	  but	  of	  being	  seen	  by	  an	  observer	  with	  a	  certain	  view	  (Williams	  
1993,	  p.	  82).	  Praise	   from	  certain	  sources	  can	  cause	  shame.	  The	  critical	  opinions	  of	  people	  
we	  despise	  or	  we	  consider	  incompetent	  to	  issue	  certain	  judgements	  can	  leave	  us	  indifferent,	  
reassure	  us	  or	  perhaps	  at	  most	  cause	  us	  some	  irritation,	  as	  Thersites	  did	  to	  the	  Achaeans16,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Genesis	  3,7-­‐8.	  See	  Velleman’s	  (2006)	  interesting	  analysis	  of	  this	  passage.	  
14	  Anna	  Karenina:	  Tolstoy	  (1877/2000),	  Part	  I,	  ch.	  24.	  Phaedra:	  Euripides,	  Hippolytus,	  lines	  373-­‐431.	  
15	  Rafael	  Sánchez	  Ferlosio	  (2000,	  p.	  30),	  for	  example,	  acknowledges	  this:	  el	  escozor	  de	  la	  vergüenza	  podemos	  
volver	  a	  sentirlo	  una	  y	  otra	  vez,	  incluso	  incrementado,	  estando	  a	  solas,	  con	  sólo	  rememorar	  imaginariamente	  la	  
situación	   social	   originaria	   de	   la	   vergüenza	   padecida	   (“the	   sting	   of	   shame	   can	   be	   felt	   time	   and	   again,	   even	  
intensified,	  when	  one	   is	  alone,	  merely	  by	  evoking	   in	  our	   imagination	   the	  original	   social	   situation	  of	   suffered	  
shame”).	  
16	  See	   the	  passage	  where	  Thersites	  encourages	  Agamemnon	  to	  call	  a	  defeat	   in	  war	  and	  allow	  his	  men	  to	  go	  
back	  home	  to	  Greece,	  and	  the	  contemptuous	  answer	  given	  by	  Odysseus:	  Il.	  2.210	  ff.	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but	  not	  shame.	  The	  observer’s	  identity	  therefore	  matters,	  as	  not	  everyone	  has	  the	  power	  to	  
trigger	   the	   self-­‐assessment	   that	   takes	   place	   in	   shame.	   Some	   examples	   suggest	   that	   the	  
relevant	   observer	   would	   be	   a	   representative	   of	   the	   community	   one	   belongs	   to.	   For	  
Penelope,	   for	   instance,	   it’s	   quite	   clear	   that	   the	   reference	   group	   are	   her	   countrywomen,	  
when	  she	  says:	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   lest	  any	  
Achaian	  woman	  in	  this	  neighbourhood	  hold	  it	  against	  me	  
that	  a	  man	  of	  many	  conquests	  lies	  with	  no	  sheet	  to	  wind	  him.17	  
But,	   after	   quoting	   this	   passage,	   Williams	   immediately	   mentions	   as	   a	   counterexample	  
Nausikaa	  who,	  worrying	  about	  what	  people	  will	  think	  seeing	  her	  with	  the	  foreigner,	  remarks:	  
And	  myself	  I	  would	  thin	  badly	  of	  a	  girl	  who	  acted	  so18.	  Nausikaa’s	  case	  is	  only	  an	  example,	  
maybe	  closer	  to	  our	  modern	  sensibilities,	  of	  something	  that	  happens	  constantly	  among	  the	  
warriors	   in	   the	   Homeric	   battlefield.	   These	   cases	   show	   what	  Williams	   calls	   the	   reciprocal	  
structure	  of	   shame	   (Williams	  1993,	  pp.	   80-­‐85):	  we	  are	  ashamed	  before	   the	  gaze	  of	   those	  
who	   would	   also	   feel	   shame	   in	   the	   same	   situation.	   We	   don’t	   feel	   shame	   before	   anyone	  
simply	  because	  we	  have	  broken	  a	  norm,	  we	  feel	  shame	  when	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in	  a	  position	  
of	   inferiority	   –owing	   to	   whatever	   reasons,	   both	   moral	   or	   non-­‐moral–	   before	   someone	  
whose	  judgement	  we	  respect	  and	  whose	  opinions	  we	  identify	  with	  in	  a	  certain	  way;	  we	  feel	  
shame	   of	   things	   we	   would	   deem	   ridiculous,	   humiliating	   or	   grotesque	   in	   others.	   But,	   as	  
Williams	  remarks,	  this	  is	  not	  purely	  a	  reciprocal	  structure	  of	  indignation,	  whereby	  I	  become	  
angry	  with	   you	  because	   I	   know	   you	  will	   be	   angry	  with	  me,	   these	   attitudes	   have	   content:	  
some	  actions	  are	  admired,	   rejected	  or	  despised,	  and	  we	   internalise	   the	  attitudes,	  not	   the	  
prospect	   of	   hostile	   reactions	   (Williams	   1993,	   pp.	   83-­‐84).	   The	   other	   is	   therefore	  
characterised	   in	  ethical	   terms.	  However,	   if	   this	   is	   so,	   the	  other	   seems	   to	  be	   reduced	   to	  a	  
mere	  representative	  of	  my	  ethical	  code,	  and	  consequently	  not	  to	  be	  “other”	  in	  any	  relevant	  
sense,	  she’s	  just	  an	  echo	  of	  my	  own	  moral	  voice.	  	  
Williams	  doesn’t	  think	  so,	  and	  he	  finds	  his	  key	  example	   in	  Sophocles’	  Ajax	   (Williams	  1993,	  
p.85),	   a	   tragedy	   where	   this	   Homeric	   hero	   commits	   suicide	   because	   his	   sense	   of	   aidos	  
doesn’t	   leave	   him	   any	   other	   choice.	   Offended	   because	   the	   chiefs	   of	   the	   army,	   who	   had	  
promised	  dead	  Achilles’	  armour	  to	  the	  best	  Achaean	  warrior,	  decide	  to	  give	  it	  to	  Odysseus	  
instead	  of	  him,	  Ajax	  plans	  to	  kill	  them	  to	  avenge	  his	  hurt	  heroic	  honour.	  However,	  when	  he’s	  
about	  to	  fulfil	  his	  revenge,	  the	  goddess	  Athena	  blinds	  him,	  and	  he	  kills	  some	  animals	  from	  
the	   army’s	   flock	   instead	   (as	   well	   as	   two	   shepherds,	   to	   whom	   Sophocles	   does	   not	   attach	  
much	   importance,	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   fact).	  When	  Ajax	   comes	  back	   to	   his	   senses	   and	   realises	  
what	  he	  has	  done,	  he	  can’t	  stand	  the	  shame	  of	  it	  and	  decides	  to	  commit	  suicide.	  In	  lines	  479	  
and	  480	  he	  explicitly	   says	  who	   is	  –or	  who	  resembles–	   the	  other	  before	  whom	  he	   feels	   so	  
ashamed:	  his	  father	  Telamon,	  himself	  an	  excellent	  and	  much	  acclaimed	  warrior	  in	  his	  youth.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Od.	  19.146	  =	  24.136.	  
18	  Od.	  6.285-­‐86.	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Ajax’s	  raging	  fury	  has	  placed	  him	  in	  a	  world	  where	  the	  people	  he	  respects	  (embodied	  in	  his	  
father’s	   figure)	   can	   no	   longer	   respect	   him;	   therefore,	   he	   can’t	   respect	   himself,	   he	   can’t	  
respect	  the	  self	  he	  has	  become	  through	  his	  actions,	  and	  he	  chooses	  the	  only	  option	  that,	  in	  
his	  view,	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  only	  identity	  he	  is	  willing	  to	  make	  his	  own:	  to	  commit	  suicide,	  
to	  literally	  disappear	  from	  the	  world.	  The	  other	  who	  looks	  at	  us	  is	  therefore	  not	  just	  an	  echo	  
of	  our	  ethical	  code.	  As	  Williams	  puts	  it:	  	  
The	   internalised	   other	   is	   indeed	   abstracted	   and	   generalised	   and	   idealised,	   but	   he	   is	  
potentially	   somebody	   rather	   than	  nobody,	   and	   somebody	  other	   than	  me.	  He	   can	  provide	  
the	   focus	   of	   real	   social	   expectations,	   of	   how	   I	   shall	   live	   if	   I	   act	   in	   one	   way	   rather	   than	  
another,	   of	   how	  my	  actions	   and	   reactions	  will	   alter	  my	   relations	   to	   the	  world	   about	  me.	  
(Williams	  1993,	  p.	  84)	  
Williams	  therefore	  believes	  that	  shame	  is	  an	  essentially	  relational	  emotion,	  which	  forces	  us	  
to	   assess	   ourselves	   in	   reference	   to	   a	   social	   environment	   that	   is	   “other”	   in	   relation	   to	  
ourselves,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   alien.	   Shame	   inseparably	   links	   the	   identity	   we	   embrace	   with	   the	  
world	  where	  we	  deploy	  it	  and	  its	  expectations.	  Shame,	  Williams	  writes,	  looks	  to	  what	  I	  am,	  
and	  exploring	   it	   can	  help	  us	  better	  understand	  how	  a	   certain	  action	  or	   thought	   stands	   to	  
ourselves,	   to	  what	  we	  are	  and	   to	  what	   realistically	  we	  can	  want	  ourselves	   to	  be	   (Williams	  
1993,	   p.	   93).	   Something	   similar	   to	   this	   has	   been	   suggested	   by	   sociologist	   Helen	  M.	   Lynd	  
(1967),	  who	   believes	   that	   the	   questioning	   of	   the	   self	   that	   takes	   place	   in	   shame	   entails	   a	  
parallel	  questioning	  of	  the	  world	  where	  that	  self	  lives	  (see	  Lynd	  1967,	  ch.	  1):	  one	  is	  shaken	  
out	  of	  the	  place	  one	  occupied.	  
Having	  analysed	  shame	  thus,	  Williams	  moves	  on	  to	  a	  detailed	  comparison	  between	  shame	  
and	  guilt.	  I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  present	  it	  here	  fully,	  because,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper,	  I’m	  
leaving	  aside	  the	  more	  explicitly	  ethical	  aspects	  of	  shame.	  However,	   from	  this	  comparison	  
Williams	  draws	  important	  conclusions,	  which	  are	  essential	  to	  his	  approach	  and	  deepen	  the	  
theme	  of	  personal	   identity.	  Williams	  contends	  that,	   if	  one	  emotion	   is	  apt	  to	  help	  us	  make	  
sense	  of	  our	  ethical	   ideas	  and	  our	  practical	  deliberation,	   that	  emotion	   is	  shame,	  not	  guilt.	  
Guilt	  can	  be	  abstracted	  as	  the	  censorship	  of	  an	  inner	  judge	  –a	  sort	  of	  Freudian	  super-­‐ego–	  
for	   having	   broken	   a	   norm	   or	   failed	   to	   fulfil	   a	   duty.	   Properly,	   it	   should	   attach	   only	   to	   the	  
voluntary.	  However,	  there	  are	  many	  cases	  where	  we	  recognise	  that	  victims	  have	  a	  right	  to	  
be	   compensated	   for	   involuntary	   damage,	   and	   we	   think	   it’s	   the	   person	   who	   involuntarily	  
caused	   the	   damage	   who	  must	   respond.	   There	   are	   cases	   when	   we	   feel	   terribly	   guilty	   for	  
involuntary	  actions.	  There	  are	  cases,	  such	  as	  Oedipus’,	  where	  our	  very	  identity	  and	  sense	  of	  
self	  depend	  on	  our	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  what	  we	  did	   involuntarily.	  Guilt	  as	  schematically	  
described	  above	  can’t	  help	  us	  make	  sense	  of	  these	  cases,	  but	  shame,	  by	  connecting	  self	  and	  
world	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  can.	  Shame’s	  structure	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  that	  our	  position	  in	  
the	   world	   and	   the	   interactions	   between	   that	   world	   and	   the	   self	   are	   subject	   to	   many	  
circumstances	   that	   lie	  outside	  of	  our	  control,	  but	   that	  we	  have	   to	   factor	   in	  as	  part	  of	  our	  
identity	  narrations.	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Shame	  in	  the	  literature	  
Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  what	  other	  authors	  have	  to	  say	  about	  shame.	  In	  the	  past	  few	  decades,	  
this	  emotion	  has	  attracted	   some	  attention	  as	  a	   topic	  of	   study	   for	  psychology,	  philosophy,	  
cultural	  studies	  and	  so	  on.	  Most	  accounts	  agree	  that	  shame	  is	  a	  distressing	  and	  disturbing	  
emotion,	   triggered	   by	   a	   negative	   self-­‐assessment	   that	   the	   subject	   performs	   upon	   him	   or	  
herself	  due	  to	  the	  exposure	  of	  some	  defect,	  fault	  or	  inadequacy	  to	  some	  ideal	  or	  norm.19	  It	  
can	  be	  due	  both	  to	  actions	  and	  to	  characteristics	  of	  the	  agent,	  which	  for	  any	  reason	  make	  
her	  feel	   inferior.	   It	  can	  also	  be	  due	  not	  to	  things	  that	  we	  do,	  but	  to	  things	  that	  happen	  to	  
us.20	  While	  these	  core	  elements	  are	  shared	  by	  most	  descriptions	  of	  shame,	  two	  basic	  sorts	  
of	   accounts	   can	   be	   distinguished:	   those	   that	   stress	   the	   social	   dimension	   and	   those	   that	  
stress	   the	   individual	   or	   personal	   dimension	   of	   shame.	   It	   seems	   obvious	   that,	  
phenomenologically,	   in	   shame	   the	   subject	   performs	   a	   self-­‐evaluation	   and	   finds	   himself	  
diminished.	   But	   it	   is	   not	   so	   obvious	   whether	   the	   standards	   according	   to	   which	   this	  
assessment	   is	   carried	   out	   are	   social	   norms	   or	   some	   kind	   of	   ideal	   of	   personal	   excellence.	  
Most	  accounts	  of	  shame	  include	  the	  following	  features	  (some	  times	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  refuting	  
them):	   shame	   as	   directed	   towards	   the	   self	   rather	   than	   others;	   shame	   as	   directed	   to	   the	  
whole	  self	  rather	  than	  to	  a	  certain	  action	  or	  feature;	  shame	  as	  a	  social	  emotion,	  often	  with	  
an	  explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  gaze	  of	  others,	  of	  an	  audience;	  shame	  as	  linked	  with	  an	  inability	  
to	  live	  up	  to	  certain	  personal	  ideals,	  values	  or	  standards.	  
The	  first	  two	  claims,	  about	  the	  object	  of	  shame,	  are	  hardly	  controversial.	  Shame	  is	  generally	  
taken	  to	  have	  two	  objects,	  a	  direct	  one	  (the	  self	  ashamed)	  and	  an	  indirect	  one	  (the	  occasion	  
of	  shame).	  So	  when,	  in	  Virginia	  Woolf’s	  story	  The	  New	  Dress,	  Mabel	  Waring	  felt	  ashamed	  of	  
her	   clothes	   at	   Mrs.	   Dalloway’s	   party,	   she	   was	   ashamed	   of	   herself	   because	   she	   was	  
improperly	  dressed;	  and	  when	  Ajax	  felt	  ashamed	  of	  having	  killed	  animals	  instead	  of	  men,	  he	  
was	  ashamed	  of	  himself	  because	  he	  had	  ridiculously	  mistaken	  the	  cattle	  for	  the	  chiefs	  of	  the	  
army.21	  Some	  times	  we	  can	  feel	  shame	  for	  another	  person,	  but	  then	  we	  do	  it	  because	  the	  
other	  is	  not	  “other”	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense,	  because	  we	  identify	  or	  associate	  with	  her	  in	  some	  
significant	   way	   (family,	   close	   friends,	   members	   of	   identity-­‐relevant	   groups,	   etc.).	   Stanley	  
Cavell,	  for	  instance,	  notes:	  
Shame	   is	   felt	   not	   only	   towards	   one’s	   own	   actions	   and	   one’s	   own	   being,	   but	   towards	   the	  
actions	  and	  the	  being	  of	   those	  with	  whom	  one	   is	   identified	  —fathers,	  daughters,	  wives…,	  
the	   beings	   whose	   self-­‐revelations	   reveal	   oneself.	   Families,	   any	   objects	   of	   one’s	   love	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  This	  definition,	  which	  is	  relatively	  tentative	  and	  does	  not	  aspire	  to	  be	  exhaustive,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  
main	  four	  features	  of	  shame	  are	  based	  on	  the	  definitions	  and	  the	  literature	  reviews	  provided	  in	  two	  papers:	  
Maibom	  (2010)	  and	  Teroni	  and	  Deonna	  (2008a).	  
20	  Which	   is	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	  why	   the	   defenders	   of	   guilt	   as	   the	   superior	  moral	   emotion	   have	   argued	   that	  
shame	  is	  less	  moral	  than	  guilt.	  
21	  See,	   respectively,	   Virginia	   Woolf’s	   story	   The	   New	   Dress	   and	   Sophocles’	   Ajax,	   which	   I	   commented	   in	   my	  
account	  of	  Williams.	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commitment,	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  places	  where	  shame	   is	  overcome	  (hence	  happy	  families	  are	  
all	  alike);	  but	  they	  are	  also	  the	  places	  of	  its	  deepest	  manufacture.	  (Cavell	  1969,	  pp.	  267-­‐353)	  
Some	  cases,	  like	  teenagers	  feeling	  ashamed	  of	  their	  parents,	  are	  very	  clear	  in	  this	  sense,	  but	  
in	  other	  cases	  the	  level	  of	  identification	  is	  not	  so	  high.	  The	  expression	  “I’m	  ashamed	  of	  you”	  
seems	  to	  carry	  much	  more	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  censure	  than	  a	  real	  sense	  of	  shame	  on	  the	  part	  
of	  the	  person	  uttering	  it.	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  feel	  real	  shame	  
for	  another	  person,	  I	  believe	  there	  is	  always	  interplay	  of	  identification	  and	  disidentification:	  
we	  don’t	  empathically	  feel	  her	  shame,	  we	  feel	  ashamed	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  shameless	  
person	  (to	  be	  in	  her	  company,	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  group,	  etc.).	  
The	   idea	   that	   shame	   implies	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   whole	   self	   isn’t	   controversial	   either.	  
Generally,	  even	  if	  shame	  comes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  certain	  action,	  we	  do	  not	  feel	  ashamed	  of	  
the	  action	  itself,	  but	  of	  being	  the	  sort	  of	  person	  who	  can	  perform	  such	  an	  action22	  (“how	  can	  
I	  possibly	  be	  so	  clumsy,	  or	  so	  absent-­‐minded,	  or	  so	  selfish,	  or	  so	  vain,	  or	  something	  else,	  to	  
behave	  like	  this?”)	  (see	  Maibom	  2010,	  p.	  568).	  Shame,	  as	  already	  stressed	  when	  discussing	  
Williams,	  uncovers	  a	  dissonance	  between	  the	  self	  and	  the	  world,	  a	  flaw,	  an	  inadequacy.	  And	  
this	   dissonance,	   even	   if	   it’s	   caused	   by	   a	   particular	   action	   or	   feature,	   affects	   the	   self	   as	   a	  
whole,	  uncovers	  it	  entirely.	  My	  initial	  quote	  of	  Lévinas’	  emphasises	  precisely	  this	  aspect,	  this	  
sense	  of	  complete,	  inescapable	  exposure,	  as	  the	  essential	  feature	  of	  shame.	  	  
If	  we	  think	  again	  of	  nakedness	  as	  the	  original	  experience	  of	  shame23,	  that	  clearly	  illustrates	  a	  
sense	   in	  which	   a	   certain	   action	   or	   feature	   can	   leave	   the	  whole	   self	   exposed.	   Helen	   Lynd	  
(1967),	   who	   in	   her	   book	   highlights	   the	   private	   dimension	   of	   shame,	   thinks	   that	   it	   is	   an	  
essential	   element	   of	   a	   self-­‐conscious	   subjectivity,	   of	   the	   ability	   —the	   need—	   to	   self-­‐
interpret	   that	   persons	   have,	   that	   even	  an	   outwardly	   trivial	   incident	   can	   become	   invested	  
with	   profound	   human	   emotion	   and	   be	   transformed	   into	   an	   event	   of	   tremendous	   import	  
(Lynd	  1967,	  p.	  41).	  This	  tremendous	  import	  arises	  precisely	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  an	  event	  
reveals	  the	  self	  as	  a	  whole	  —a	  revelation	  that	  in	  Lynd’s	  account,	  as	  in	  Lévinas’,	  is	  always	  first	  
and	   foremost	   an	   exposure	   of	   oneself	   to	   oneself	   (Lynd	   1967,	   p.	   30)—	   and	   throws	   into	  
question	  the	  self	  and	  the	  world	  where	  he	  lives.	  
Markedly	   social	   accounts	   of	   shame	   also	   agree	   with	   and	   emphasise	   this	   aspect.	   Sánchez	  
Ferlosio	   (2000),	   for	  example,	   interprets	   shame	  as	   the	  mechanism	  through	  which	  we	   learn	  
and	   appropriate	   social	   rules	   of	   belonging.	   Heidi	   Maibom	   (2010)	   gives	   an	   evolutionary	  
account	  of	  shame,	  taking	  a	  look	  at	  behaviour	  patterns	  in	  non-­‐human	  animals,	  and	  defends	  
that	  some	  features	  of	  the	  emotion	  we	  call	  shame	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  product	  of	  
appeasement	  mechanisms	   in	   hierarchical	   social	   structures.	  Mechanisms	   of	   belonging	   and	  
hierarchies	   are	   precisely	   the	   sort	   of	   structures	  where	   the	   status	   of	   an	   individual,	   i.e.,	   her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  When	  shame	   is	  unequivocally	  moral,	   this	   is	   taken	   to	  be	   the	  crucial	  phenomenological	  difference	  between	  
shame	  and	  guilt:	  guilt	  attaches	  to	  the	  action,	  shame	  attaches	  to	  the	  self.	  
23	  This	   association	   is	   stressed	   not	   only	   by	  Williams,	   but	   also	   by	   other	   authors	   such	   as	   Scheler	   (1913/1987),	  
Lévinas	  (1935/2003)	  or	  Velleman	  (2006).	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identity,	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  single	  action	  or	  feature,	  so	  these	  accounts	  also	  provide	  a	  good	  
model	  for	  understanding	  how	  a	  single	  feature	  or	  action	  can	  affect	  the	  self	  as	  a	  whole.	  
Let	  us	  turn	  now	  to	  the	  point	  where	  disagreement	  arises.	  Is	  shame,	  then,	  a	  private	  or	  a	  social	  
emotion?	  My	  initial	  quote	  of	  Lévinas	  stresses	  the	  intimate	  character	  of	  shame,	  the	  primacy	  
of	  exposure	  of	  oneself	  to	  oneself.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Williams’	  whole	  account	  turns	  around	  
the	  idea	  of	  the	  gaze	  of	  another	  and	  finds	  the	  main	  “virtue”	  of	  shame	  precisely	  in	  its	  social	  
character.	  
The	   idea	   that	   shame	   is	   social	   has	   been	   recently	   challenged	   by	   Deonna,	   Rodogno	   and	  
Teroni24,	  for	  instance.	  Their	  approach	  draws	  a	  certain	  measure	  of	  inspiration	  from	  (Scheler,	  
1913/1987)	  and	  Lynd	   (1967),	   although	   it	  deviates	   from	  both	   in	   important	  ways,	   it’s	  much	  
more	   elaborate	   than	   any	   of	   those	   accounts,	   and	   all	   in	   all	   constitutes	   a	   highly	   original	  
proposal.	  But	  let	  us	  look	  at	  Scheler	  and	  Lynd	  first.	  	  
In	  his	  phenomenological	  analysis	  of	  shame,	  Scheler	  (1913/1987)	  defines	  it	  as	  an	  emotion	  of	  
self-­‐protection,	  associated	  with	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  threat	  to	  a	  cherished	  value,	  which	  the	  
subject	   wants	   to	   safeguard.	   For	   Scheler,	   shame	   appears	   in	   a	   transitional	   space	   between	  
being	   recognised	   as	   a	   subject	   and	   being	   observed	   as	   an	   object,	   and	   vice	   versa.	   The	   self-­‐
assessing	  dimension	  doesn’t	  appear	  clearly	   in	  his	  account;	   for	  him	  the	  essential	   feature	  of	  
shame	   is	   the	   consciousness	   of	   a	   spiritual	   value	   that	   must	   be	   preserved	   against	   external	  
attacks	  and	  against	  the	  individual’s	  animal	  drives,	  which	  may	  undermine	  it.	  
Helen	   Lynd	   thinks	   that	   the	   exposure	   to	   the	   eyes	   of	   others	   is	   less	   important	   than	   the	  
exposure	  of	  oneself	  to	  oneself,	  the	  sudden	  discovery	  that	  one	  is	  not	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  one	  
wanted	  to	  be:	  
I	   think	   that	   this	   public	   exposure	   of	   even	   a	   very	   private	   part	   of	   one’s	   physical	   or	   mental	  
character	  could	  not	   in	   itself	  have	  brought	  about	  shame	  unless	  one	  had	  already	  felt	  within	  
oneself,	  not	  only	  dislike,	  but	  shame	  for	  these	  traits…	  it	  is	  the	  exposure	  of	  oneself	  to	  oneself	  
that	  is	  crucial.	  (Lynd	  1967,	  pp.	  29-­‐30).	  
Lynd,	   like	   Lévinas	   in	   the	   quotation	   that	   heads	   this	   paper,	   stresses	   here	   that	   the	   essential	  
element	   is	  this	  self-­‐discovery,	  this	  self-­‐consciousness.	  Lynd	  (1967,	  pp.	  43-­‐49)	  adds	  surprise	  
to	   it:	  we	  move	   in	   a	  world	   of	   everyday	   expectations,	  with	   a	  more	   or	   less	   spontaneous	   or	  
unreflective	   security	   about	   what	   we	   are.	   Suddenly,	   something	   happens,	   important	   or	  
unimportant,	   big	   or	   small,	   with	   or	   without	   moral	   connotations,	   and	   this	   something	  
undresses	  me,	  unsettles	  my	  answers	  to	  the	  questions	  about	  who	  I	  am	  and	  what	  is	  my	  place	  
in	   the	  world,	   the	   basic	   assumptions	   upon	  which	  my	   identity	   rests,	   the	   ongoing	   narration	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Their	  book	  In	  Defence	  of	  Shame	  (2011)	  has	  recently	  come	  out,	  but	  unfortunately	  I	  haven’t	  been	  able	  to	  study	  
it	  well	  enough	  yet.	  My	  remarks	  on	  their	  views	  are	  drawn	  from	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  on	  shame	  by	  Deonna	  and	  
Teroni,	  which	  are	  listed	  among	  the	  references	  and	  quoted	  where	  appropriate.	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through	  which	  I	  constitute	  myself25.	  And	  the	  key	  is	  my	  own	  sharpened	  consciousness	  of	  this	  
discrepancy.	  That	  factor	  is	  crucial,	  for	  example,	  to	  the	  perpetual	  shame	  of	  Josef	  K	  at	  Kafka’s	  
The	  Trial.	  
Julien	  Deonna	  and	  Fabrice	  Teroni	  (2008a,	  2008b	  and	  2009)	  also	  think,	  like	  Lynd,	  that	  shame	  
is	  mainly	  connected	  to	  this	  presence	  of	  oneself	  to	  oneself.	  They	  link	   it,	   like	  Scheler,	  to	  the	  
subject’s	   inner	  values	  and	  the	   ideal	  representation	  he	  makes	  of	  himself.	   In	  their	  view,	  the	  
often	  referred-­‐to	  phenomenology	  of	  the	  gaze	  of	  another,	  of	  the	  internalised	  audience	  that	  
observes	  us,	  does	  not	  appear	  clearly	  in	  many	  cases,	  and	  in	  their	  view	  it	  represents	  rather	  a	  
metaphor	  through	  which	  we	  think	  retrospectively	  about	  shame.	  Their	  analysis	  of	  shame	  is	  
based	  on	  a	  concept	  of	  the	  self	  and	  of	  identity	  that	  bears	  some	  important	  relations	  to	  Harry	  
Frankfurt’s	  (1988	  and	  1999).	  According	  to	  him,	  the	  core	  self	  is	  constituted	  by	  “what	  we	  care	  
about”,	  by	  the	  profound	  values	  and	  ideals	  that	  actually	  shape	  our	  will	  and	  guide	  our	  actions,	  
and	  which	  we	  moreover	  make	  our	  own,	  appropriate	  as	  part	  of	  ourselves.	  Frankfurt	   thinks	  
we	   shape	   our	   identities	   by	   selecting	   among	   the	   materials	   of	   our	   psychical	   life,	   and	  
appropriating	  some	  of	  them	  rather	  than	  others	  through	  action;	  so,	  in	  his	  view,	  self,	  identity	  
and	  agency	  are	  indissolubly	  tied.	  
Deonna	   and	   Teroni	   also	   think	   about	   identity	   in	   terms	   of	   values	   we	   care	   about,	   but	   they	  
don’t	  tie	  it	  so	  closely	  to	  action:	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  hold,	  often	  as	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  our	  identity,	  
values	   that	   are	   not	   active	   at	   all,	   such	   as	   those	   connected	   to	   physical	   appearance,	   family,	  
ethnic	  group	  or	  nationality.	   They	   stress	   the	   fact	   that,	   for	   these	  values	   to	  be	  part	  of	  one’s	  
identity,	  it’s	  not	  enough	  to	  deem	  them	  positive	  or	  important	  in	  general,	  one	  has	  to	  want	  to	  
exemplify	  and	  reflect	  them	  in	  one’s	   life.	  One	  can	  value	  good	  art,	   for	  example,	  and	  think	   it	  
important	   for	   society	   that	   there	   are	   good	   artists	   in	   the	  world,	  without	  wanting	   to	   be	   an	  
artist	   oneself.	   The	   identity-­‐relevant	   value	  here	  would	  be	  having	  discernment	   for	   good	  art	  
(recognising	   a	   good	   piece	   when	   seeing	   it),	   whereas	   artistic	   creativity	   would	   be	   valued	  
positively,	   without	   being	   identity-­‐relevant.	   The	   distinction	   is	   crucial,	   because	   for	   Deonna	  
and	  Teroni	  (2008b,	  p.	  40)	  shame	  arises	  from	  the	  perception	  that	  one	  isn’t	  able	  to	  exemplify,	  
even	  minimally26,	  a	  value	  one	   identifies	  with	  and	  cares	  to	  reflect	   in	  one’s	   life.	  For	  Deonna	  
and	   Teroni,	   the	   frequent	   interpretation	   of	   shame	   as	   social	   comes	   from	   the	   crucial	  
importance	  that	  we,	  as	  social	  beings,	  attach	  in	  our	  lives	  to	  others	  and	  to	  our	  relations	  with	  
them.	  
Bernard	  Williams,	  for	  whom	  the	  social	  side	  of	  shame	  is	  essential,	  would	  of	  course	  disagree	  
with	   this	   interpretation,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   and	   so	   would	   many	   other	   authors.27	  Sánchez	  
Ferlosio	  (2001)	  emphasises	  the	  fact	  that	  shame	  is	  tied	  to	  our	  social	  nature,	  to	  our	  need	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  I’ll	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  issues	  connected	  to	  narration	  in	  the	  final	  section	  of	  this	  paper.	  On	  this	  topic,	  see	  
Schechtman	  (1996).	  
26	  They	   recognise	  degrees	  of	   exemplification	   (with	   a	  minimal	   threshold	  of	  non-­‐exemplification,	  below	  which	  
shame	  appears)	  and	  hierarchies	  of	  value	  importance.	  This	  allows	  them	  to	  account	  for	  instances	  where	  a	  faulty	  
exemplification	  of	  a	  value	  doesn’t	  cause	  shame,	  and	  for	  differences	  in	  intensity	  of	  shame	  episodes.	  
27	  Among	  them,	  for	  instance:	  Taylor	  (1985),	  Velleman	  (2006)	  and	  Sánchez	  Ferlosio	  (2000).	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belong	  to	  a	  group	  (initially	   the	  family)	  and	  be	  accepted	  as	  a	  member	  of	   it.	  Shame	  for	  him	  
appears	  with	  the	  realisation	  that	  we	  don’t	  fit	  in	  and	  that	  our	  status	  as	  members	  of	  the	  group	  
is	  threatened.	  	  
Heidi	  Maibom	  (2010)	  makes	  a	  related	  argument,	  although	  more	  nuanced	  and	  convincing	  in	  
its	  approach.	  She	  tries	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  model	  that	  can	  account	  for	  paradigmatic	  episodes	  
of	  shame,	  but	  also	  with	  such	  paradoxical	  and	  pressing	  cases	  as	  the	  shame	  experienced	  by	  
victims	  of	  brutal	  abuses,	   such	  as	   rape	  or	  genocide.	  She’s	  also	  puzzled	  about	   the	   immense	  
power	   to	   cause	   shame	   that	   high-­‐ranking	   individuals	   or	   institutions	   have,	   as	   opposed	   to	  
lower-­‐ranking	  ones.	  In	  order	  to	  elucidate	  these	  questions,	  she	  looks	  back	  at	  the	  past	  of	  our	  
species	  from	  an	  evolutionary	  point	  of	  view.	  She	  argues	  that	  shame	  descends	  from	  a	  primary	  
emotion	   associated	   to	   submission	   and	   appeasement	   behaviour,	   which	   is	   an	   essential	  
conflict-­‐solving	  mechanism	   for	   social	   animals.	   This	   basic	  mechanism,	  which	   can	   avoid	   the	  
use	  of	  violence	  in	  conflict	  situations	  and	  can	  also	  prevent	  such	  situations	  from	  even	  arising,	  
gives	   rise	   to	  much	  more	   complicated	   dynamics	   in	   complex	   societies,	   such	   as	   our	   human	  
ones,	   where	   cooperation	   is	   essential	   and	   the	   opinions	   of	   peers	   gain	   importance.	   Shame	  
takes	  its	  basic	  traits	  from	  this	  model,	  which	  helps	  to	  explain	  its	  connection	  to	  hierarchy	  and	  
the	  mechanism	  through	  which	  victims	  of	  abuse	  feel	  ashamed.	  
Shame	  for	  Maibom	  is	  essentially	  social	  and	  essentially	  heteronomous,	  which	  has	  a	  positive	  
side,	  as	  we	  saw	  with	  Williams,	  but	  also	  a	  negative,	  deeply	  violent	  one.	  What	  she	  proposes,	  
but	  does	  not	  develop	  yet	  in	  her	  paper,	  is	  closely	  in	  line	  with	  Williams’	  aim:	  a	  change	  in	  our	  
way	  of	  thinking	  about	  morality.	  I	  quote	  her:	  
Shame	   is	   a	   response	   to	   shortcomings	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   public	   expectations.	   Shame	   is	  
essentially	   about	   our	   lives	   with	   others,	   about	   our	   identity	   in	   a	   group,	   and	   our	   standing	  
within	  it…	  as	  social	  creatures	  we	  are	  embedded	  in	  a	  life	  with	  others	  where	  we	  acknowledge	  
the	  desirability	  of	  acting	  in	  certain	  ways	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  not	  doing	  so…	  [This]	  does	  
not	  amount	  to	  accepting	  all	  the	  individual	  norms	  and	  standards	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  public	  
realm…	  we	   can	   feel	   shame…	  merely	   because	  others	   disapprove	  of	   us.	   This	   is,	   as	   Calhoun	  
aptly	  points	  out,	  part	  of	  the	  communal	  character	  of	  the	  moral	  life	  or,	  as	  I	  prefer	  to	  think	  of	  
it,	   our	   life	   together,	   since	   not	   all	   shame-­‐inducing	   failing	   involves	   specifically	   moral	  
considerations.	  (Maibom	  2010,	  p.	  576).	  
My	  own	  position	  is	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  these	  “social”	  theorists.	  The	  fact	  that	  shame	  can	  be	  
felt	  as	  the	  most	  private	  of	  experiences28	  or	  that	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  the	  gaze	  of	  another	  
is	   not	   always	   recognisable	   doesn’t	   mean	   that	   shame	   can	   be	   made	   intelligible	   without	   a	  
reference	  to	  another.	  How	  could	  we	  learn	  to	  judge	  ourselves	  from	  the	  outside,	  how	  could	  
we	  know	  that	  there	  are	  other	  viewpoints	  to	  look	  at	  ourselves	  from,	  if	  there	  were	  no	  others	  
to	  show	  us?	  Let	  us	  go	  back	  to	  Lévinas’	  definition	  of	  shame:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Although	  I	  dare	  say	  that	  this	  could	  probably	  be	  argued	  of	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  most	  emotions.	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It	  is	  the	  representation	  we	  form	  of	  ourselves	  as	  diminished	  beings	  with	  which	  we	  are	  pained	  
to	   identify.	   Yet	   shame’s	  whole	   intensity…	   consists	   precisely	   in	  our	   inability	   not	   to	   identify	  
with	  this	  being	  who	  is	  already	  foreign	  to	  us	  and	  whose	  motives	  for	  acting	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  
comprehend	  (Lévinas	  1935/2003,	  p.	  63).	  
How	  does	  this	  perspective	  arise,	  this	  possibility	  to	  look	  at	  myself	  as	  a	  “foreign	  being”?	  Surely	  
we	   learn	   about	   this	   variety	   of	   perspectives	   in	   our	   interactions	  with	   others;	  we	  only	   learn	  
that	   we	   are	   selves	   when	   we	   realise	   that	   there	   are	   others,	   as	   developmental	   psychology	  
shows.	   In	   the	  same	  movement,	   the	  other	   teaches	  me	  of	  her	  existence	  and	  shows	  me	   the	  
limits	  of	  my	  own	  self.	  And	  it	  is	  not	  that	  I	  need	  another	  to	  feel	  shame,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  I	  need	  
him	  to	  feel	  love.	  Actually,	  I	  do	  not	  need	  him	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  at	  all.	  In	  love,	  he	  has	  to	  be	  
really	  outside,	  there,	   in	  front	  of	  me.	  My	  gaze	  goes	  out,	  toward	  him.	  In	  shame	  I	  have	  to	  go	  
outside	  myself	  and	  take	  his	  position,	  put	  myself	  where	  he	  was	  standing	  and	  look	  at	  me.	  Why	  
would	  I	  do	  that	   if	   I	  did	  not	  care	  about	  how	  the	  world	  looks	  from	  there?	  Why	  would	  I	  care	  
about	  this	  if	  I	  did	  not	  care	  about	  my	  appearance	  before	  the	  world	  and	  the	  way	  it	  can	  affect	  
my	   relations	   with	   it?	   In	   shame,	   I	   see	   that	   I	   am	   being	   seen.29	  Shame	   essentially	   involves	  
caring	  about	  my	  position	   in	   the	  social	  world.	   It	   involves	  reciprocity,	  as	  Williams	  defended,	  
and	  reciprocity	  can’t	  exist	  if	  one	  of	  the	  poles	  is	  absent.	  Love	  can	  be	  conceived	  in	  a	  unilateral	  
way,	   where	   activity	   lies	   exclusively	   on	   the	   side	   of	   the	   lover	   (one	   can	   love	   an	   inanimate	  
object,	  an	  idea,	  etc.).	  For	  shame	  to	  make	  the	  slightest	  bit	  of	  sense	  there	  has	  to	  be	  an	  active,	  
understanding,	   judging	   other	   looking	   at	   me.	   As	   Williams	   argued,	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	  
internalised	   and	   often,	   but	   not	   always,	   even	   closely	   identified	   with	   some	   of	   my	   values	  
doesn’t	  mean	   it	   isn’t	  “other”.	   In	  my	  view,	  this	  otherness	   is	  essential	   to	  understand	  shame	  
and	  to	  understand	  ourselves.	  
	  
Shame	  and	  the	  narrative	  self	  
A	  short	  paper	  on	  shame	  like	  this	  one	  is	  no	  place	  for	  a	  detailed	  argument	  on	  the	  virtues	  and	  
weaknesses	  of	  a	  narrative	  understanding	  of	  the	  self.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  self	  is	  a	  narrative	  or	  
has	   a	   narrative	   structure	   has	   been	   widely	   advocated	   and	   criticised	   by	   continental	   and	  
analytic	  philosophers	  alike30,	  and	  I	  can’t	  now	  go	  into	  detail	  about	  such	  controversies.	  Suffice	  
it	   to	   say	   here	   that	   I	   take	   our	   personal	   narratives	   to	   be	   the	   fundamental	   means	   through	  
which	   we	   engage	   with	   our	   past	   and	   our	   future,	   and	   thereby	   achieve	   a	   sense	   of	   identity	  
through	  time,	  much	  in	  the	  way	  put	  forward	  by	  Peter	  Goldie	  (2009).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  I	   am	   grateful	   to	   Antonio	   Gómez	   Ramos	   for	   this	   formulation,	   which	   so	   neatly	   captures	   the	   reciprocity	   of	  
shame.	  
30	  The	   two	   names	   that	   one	   must	   mention	   here	   as	   original	   proponents	   of	   this	   idea	   are,	   of	   course,	   in	   their	  
respective	   traditions,	   Alasdair	   MacIntyre	   (1981/2007)	   and	   Paul	   Ricoeur	   (1990).	   Their	   ideas	   have	   had	   an	  
enormous	  influence,	  and	  other	  philosophers	  have	  given	  them	  much	  thought,	  refined	  and	  criticised	  them	  from	  
many	  perspectives.	  My	  account	  of	  shame	  here	  will	  try	  to	  keep	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  narratives	  in	  order	  
to	  make	  sense	  of	  our	  lives,	  while	  arguing	  that	  shame	  can	  be	  a	  warning	  sign	  against	  some	  dangerous	  tendencies	  
spotted	  by	  critics	  of	  the	  narrative	  view.	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The	   first	   versions	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   narrative	   self	   came	  under	  much	   (justified)	   criticism	   for	  
several	   reasons:	   they	   seem	   to	   give	   the	   self	   excessive	   authorial	   power	   and	   exclusive	  
ownership	  of	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  “authentic”	  self;	  they	  seek	  to	  invest	  a	  life	  of	  a	  coherence	  
and	   a	   meaning	   that	   stories	   can	   have,	   but	   events	   in	   the	   real	   world	   rarely	   possess;	   they	  
therefore	  encourage	  self-­‐deception,	   invention	  and	  fictionalising,	  and	  seem	  to	  be	  relatively	  
impervious	  to	  criticism,	  as	  no	  internal	  elements	  of	  a	  narration	  can	  enable	  us	  to	  distinguish	  
between	  reality	  and	  fiction.	  Thus	  put,	  these	  criticisms	  seem	  too	  unnuanced	  to	  be	  completely	  
true	  even	  of	  Ricoeur	  or	  MacIntyre,	  but	   they	  do	  catch	   the	  main	  objections	  and	  dangers	  of	  
narration,	   they	   were	   taken	   on	   board,	   and	  most	   accounts	   of	   narrative	   identity	   nowadays	  
include	  constraints	   that	  answer	   to	   these	  worries.	  Marya	  Schechtman	   (1996),	   for	  example,	  
argues	   that	   having	   a	   narrative	   doesn’t	   mean	   that	   the	   subject	   is	   entirely	   transparent	   to	  
herself	  nor	  that	  this	  narrative	   is	   the	  authentic	  expression	  of	   it.	  This	  rather	  means	  that	  the	  
subject	   possesses	   a	   structure	   that	   enables	   her	   to	   lead	   the	   life	   of	   a	   person.	   Because	  
personhood	   is	   intrinsically	   social	   (personhood	   necessarily	   entails	   living	   with	   others),	   one	  
needs	   a	   self-­‐concept	   that	   is	   basically	   in	   synch	   with	   the	   view	   of	   one	   held	   by	   others	  
(Schechtman	  1996,	  p.	  95).	  Moreover,	  when	  thinking	  about	  narration	  of	  the	  story	  of	  our	  lives,	  
one	  need	  not	  think	  that	  this	  narration	  has	  to	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  traditional	  novel,	  with	  an	  
omniscient	  narrator,	  a	  linear	  succession	  of	  events,	  an	  exposition,	  a	  climax	  and	  a	  resolution.	  
Modern	   novels,	   films	   and	   so	   on	   have	   taught	   us	   that	  many	   other	   kinds	   of	   narrations	   are	  
possible.	  
The	  idea	  I	  want	  to	  put	  forward	  here	  is	  that	  shame	  can	  be	  a	  warning	  against	  the	  danger	  of	  
self-­‐deception	  in	  our	  personal	  narratives.	  Because	  of	  its	  social	  character,	  it	  can	  help	  us	  think	  
about	   ourselves	   in	   terms	   that	   are	   more	   in	   line	   with	   the	   world	   and	   its	   expectations	   and	  
reorient	   the	   way	   we	   think	   about	   our	   future.	   Shame	   can	   happen	   in	   the	   present	   or	   be	  
backward-­‐looking,	   of	   course,	   it	   can	   be	   tied	   to	   real	   actions	   or	   situations;	   but	   it	   also	   has	   a	  
forward-­‐looking,	  preventive	  side,	  which	  allowed	  Ancient	  Greeks	   to	   link	   it	  closely	   to	  virtue.	  
Shame	   can	   help	   us	   understand	   the	   role	   of	   others	   in	   our	   lives	   and	   in	   our	   narratives;	   it	  
certainly	  prevents	  us	  from	  forgetting	  it	  completely.	  
But	  shame	  can	  also	  be	  a	  way	  of	  engaging	  with	  our	  past,	  productively,	  if	  we	  learn	  from	  it,	  like	  
Neoptolemus	   in	   Sophocles’	   Philoctetes;	   destructively,	   if	   we	   can’t	   accept	   it	   and	   run	   away	  
from	  our	   actions,	   like	   King	   Lear	   in	   Shakespeare’s	   tragedy,	   or	   Lord	   Jim	   in	   Joseph	   Conrad’s	  
novel.	  Marya	  Schechtman	  (2001)	  has	  also	  argued	  that	  in	  order	  for	  our	  identity	  to	  survive,	  in	  
order	   for	   us	   not	   to	   become	   so	   alienated	   from	   our	   past	   that	   we	   also	   literally	   become	   a	  
different	  person,	  we	  must	  have	  what	  she	  calls	  “empathic	  access”	  to	  our	  past.	  That	  means	  
being	  able	  to	  remember	   it	   in	  the	  first	  person,	   from	  the	   inside,	  and	  having	  “a	  fundamental	  
sympathy	  for	  the	  states	  which	  are	  recalled	  in	  this	  way”	  (S.	  2001,	  p.	  106).	  Peter	  Goldie	  (2011)	  
disagrees,	  because	  he	  thinks	  Schechtman’s	  conditions	  are	  too	  restrictive	  and	  we	  can’t	  take	  
seriously	  the	  claim	  that,	  through	  an	  identity	  crisis,	  we	  literally	  become	  a	  different	  person.	  I	  
agree	   with	   him	   in	   this,	   because	   I	   think	   that	   taking	   such	   claims	   seriously	   would	   leave	   us	  
facing	   very	  undesirable	   implications	   for	   responsibility,	  morality	   and	  our	   relationships	  with	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others.	  Besides,	  I	  believe	  there	  is	  a	  very	  important	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  never	  mean	  what	  we	  
say	   when	   we	   say	   that	   we	   have	   become	   a	   different	   person.	   Shame	   shows	   us	   this.	   Deep	  
shame	   contains	   a	   powerful	   element	   of	   disidentification,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   it	   tells	   us	  
unequivocally	  that	  “this	  is	  me”,	  however	  much	  we	  may	  wish	  it	  weren’t.	  If	  this	  weren’t	  me,	  
shame	  wouldn’t	  even	  appear.	  Again,	  Lévinas:	  
Shame’s	  whole	   intensity…	  consists	  precisely	   in	  our	   inability	  not	   to	   identify	  with	   this	  being	  
who	  is	  already	  foreign	  to	  us	  and	  whose	  motives	  for	  acting	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  comprehend…	  
What	   appears	   in	   shame	   is	   thus	   precisely	   the	   fact	   of	   being	   riveted	   to	   oneself,	   the	   radical	  
impossibility	  of	  fleeing	  oneself	  to	  hide	  from	  oneself,	  the	  unalterably	  binding	  presence	  of	  the	  
I	  to	  itself.	  (Lévinas	  1935/2003,	  pp.	  63-­‐64)	  
Shame,	  thus,	  would	  precisely	  be	  the	  wish	  not	  to	  be	  the	  person	  I	  know	  I	  am.	  
Let	  me	   illustrate	  my	  point	   through	  a	  beautiful	  example,	  discussed	  by	  both	  Gabriele	  Taylor	  
(1985)	  and	  Peter	  Goldie	   (2000).	   It’s	  an	  example	   taken	   from	   James	   Joyce’s	   short	   story	  The	  
Dead,	  the	  story	  that	  closes	  his	  Dubliners.	  The	  situation	  is	  neither	  particularly	  tied	  to	  morality	  
nor,	   on	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   would	   it	   seem	   an	   exceptionally	   important	   event	   in	   the	   main	  
character’s	   life.	   Yet	   it	   clearly	   shows,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   dissonance	   between	   the	  
character’s	   personal	   narrative	   and	   the	   world	   and,	   on	   the	   other,	   how	   shame	   can	   be	   an	  
identity-­‐preserving	  relation	  to	  one’s	  past	  without	  implying	  empathy	  with	  it.	  
The	  situation	  is	  the	  following:	  Gabriel	  Conroy	  and	  his	  wife,	  Gretta,	  have	  been	  to	  a	  Christmas	  
party	  organised	  by	  Gabriel’s	  aunts.	  On	  their	  way	  out	  of	  the	  house,	  as	  they	  are	  putting	  their	  
warm	  clothes	  on	  and	  saying	  their	  goodbyes,	  Gretta	  pauses,	  with	  an	  absent	  and	  melancholy	  
expression,	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  piano	  still	  playing	  in	  the	  drawing	  room.	  Seeing	  her	  thus,	  Gabriel	  
finds	  her	   incredibly	  beautiful	  and	  starts	  evoking	  their	  happy	  past	   together,	  which	  arises	   in	  
him	  feelings	  of	  intense	  tenderness	  and	  desire	  for	  her,	  and	  launches	  him	  into	  a	  reverie	  while	  
they	   move	   through	   the	   streets	   of	   Dublin	   with	   other	   guests	   returning	   home.	   When	   they	  
finally	   arrive	   to	   their	   room	  and	  are	   left	   alone,	  Gabriel	   discovers	   that	  Gretta	  has	  not	  been	  
thinking	  about	  him,	  but	  remembering	  a	  love	  story	  from	  her	  youth,	  the	  story	  of	  a	  fragile	  and	  
sick	  boy	  who	  always	  used	  to	  sing	  the	  song	  they	  had	  heard	  from	  a	  distance	  at	  the	  party.	  A	  
youth	  that	  died	  “for	  her”,	  Gretta	  says,	  many	  years	  ago,	  after	  waiting	  under	  her	  window	  in	  
the	  cold	  to	  say	  goodbye,	  before	  she	  was	  sent	  to	  school	  to	  Dublin	  in	  order	  to	  separate	  them.	  
Gretta	   doesn’t	   have	   the	   slightest	   suspicion	   about	   what	   has	   been	   going	   on	   in	   Gabriel’s	  
thoughts,	  but	  he,	  who	  had	  feebly	  tried	  to	  stop	  her	  telling	  the	  story	  by	  making	  ironic	  remarks,	  
feels	  deeply	  ashamed:	  
Gabriel	  felt	  humiliated	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  his	  irony	  and	  by	  the	  evocation	  of	  this	  figure	  from	  the	  
dead…	  While	  he	  had	  been	   full	  of	  memories	  of	   their	  secret	   life	   together,	   full	  of	   tenderness	  
and	   joy	   and	   desire,	   she	   had	   been	   comparing	   him	   in	   her	  mind	   with	   another.	   A	   shameful	  
consciousness	  of	  his	  own	  person	  assailed	  him.	  He	  saw	  himself	  as	  a	  ludicrous	  figure,	  acting	  
as	  a	  pennyboy	  for	  his	  aunts,	  a	  nervous	  well-­‐meaning	  sentimentalist,	  orating	  to	  vulgarians	  
and	  idealising	  his	  own	  clownish	  lust,	  the	  pitiable	  fatuous	  fellow	  he	  had	  caught	  a	  glimpse	  of	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in	   the	   mirror.	   Instinctively	   he	   turned	   his	   back	   more	   to	   the	   light,	   lest	   she	   might	   see	   the	  
shame	  that	  burned	  upon	  his	  forehead.	  (Joyce	  1914/2000,	  p.	  221).	  
Why	  should	  he	  feel	  thus?	  What’s	  so	  shameful	  about	  showing	  he	  cares	  for	  her	  adoring	  aunts,	  
delivering	   the	   flattering	   speech	   everyone	   expected,	   romantically	   evoking	   the	   past	   and	  
desiring	  his	  wife?	  Besides,	  when	  he	  is	  left	  alone	  with	  Gretta,	  he	  doesn’t	  coarsely	  impose	  his	  
desire	  on	  her.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   he	   treats	   her	  with	  delicacy	   and	  he	   is	   sensitive	   and	   caring	  
enough	  to	  listen	  to	  her	  tale,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  emotions	  it	  arises	  in	  him.	  He	  does	  lend	  her	  the	  
ear	   she	   needs	   and	   represses	   the	   expression	   of	   his	   own	   feelings	   in	   consideration	   of	   hers.	  
What	  does	  he	  have	  to	  regret?	  Granted,	  she	  didn’t	  feel	  the	  same	  desire	  for	  him	  at	  that	  very	  
moment.	  But	  is	  there	  anything	  extraordinary	  or	  shameful	  in	  that	  lack	  of	  synchrony	  of	  desire	  
in	   any	   couple?	   Wouldn’t	   they	   have	   experienced	   it	   many	   times,	   after	   several	   years	   of	  
marriage	  and	  a	  few	  children	  in	  common?	  Moreover,	  she	  hasn’t	  even	  rejected	  him,	  because	  
he	  didn’t	   actually	   ask	   for	   anything.	  Why,	   then,	   that	   deep	   shame	   that	   extends	  back	   to	  his	  
behaviour	  of	  the	  whole	  evening?	  
The	   emotion	   is	   intelligible,	   of	   course,	   and	  we	   understand	   it	   through	   the	   narration	   of	   the	  
evening’s	   events	   and	   of	   Gabriel’s	   thoughts.	   But	   we	   don’t	   understand	   it	   because	   it	  
harmoniously	  fits	  into	  the	  story,	  but	  precisely	  because	  we	  perceive	  the	  dissonance	  and	  the	  
gap	  that	  opens	  between	  Gabriel’s	  image	  of	  the	  world	  and	  of	  Gretta,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
reality,	   on	   the	   other.	   Gretta’s	   story	   fractures	   and	   unsettles	   Gabriel’s	   narration.	   It	   is	   the	  
screech	  that	  makes	  us	  realise	  the	  dangers	  of	  narration,	  of	  self-­‐deception,	  and	  also,	  crucially,	  
makes	   us	   become	   conscious	   that	  we	   are	   not	   so	   autonomous	   as	   the	   author	   status	  would	  
seem	   to	   imply.	   Some	   times,	   others	   and	   the	   world	   clash	   against	   our	   narrations	   and	  
completely	   destabilize	   them.	   And	   in	   this	   particular	   case,	   paradoxically,	   the	   effect	   is	   even	  
stronger	  because,	  as	  already	  noted,	  she	  doesn’t	  reject	  him:	  she	  didn’t	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  do	  it,	  
because	   he	   didn’t	   even	   express	   his	   desires.	   Gabriel	   merely	   desired,	   and	   unquestioningly	  
expected	   that	   things	  would	   turn	   out	   the	  way	  he	  wished.	  When	  he	   asks	  Gretta	   about	   her	  
thoughts,	  he	  is	   left	  facing	  the	  enormous	  gap	  between	  his	  own	  image	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  
reality	  of	  it,	  which	  makes	  him	  throw	  into	  question	  all	  his	  unreflective	  beliefs,	  all	  those	  things	  
he	  took	  for	  granted	  about	  his	  place	  in	  the	  world.	  
Interestingly,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   Gretta	   never	   even	   suspects	   her	   husband’s	   shame,	   her	  
presence,	  and	  the	  way	  Gabriel	  represents	  to	  himself	  his	  own	  image	  in	  her	  eyes,	  should	  she	  
know	  what	  he	  was	  thinking,	  are	  indispensable	  for	  his	  shame.	  He	  sees	  his	  own	  reflection	  in	  
the	  mirror,	  of	  course,	  but	  chiefly	  the	  mirror	  where	  he	  sees	  himself	   is	  she.	  Without	  others,	  
who	   teach	  me	   that	   there	   are	   different	   perspectives	   to	   look	   at	   the	   world	   and	   to	   look	   at	  
myself,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  self.	  And	  yet,	  there’s	  something	  curious	  in	  this	  case:	  judging	  from	  
the	  way	  Gretta	  is	  described	  by	  Joyce,	  by	  her	  behaviour	  toward	  her	  husband	  and	  her	  in-­‐laws,	  
by	  the	  things	  we	  are	  told	  about	  her	  relationship	  with	  him,	  it	  seems	  quite	  implausible	  for	  her	  
to	   judge	  Gabriel	  as	  he	   judges	  himself.	  She	   is	  no	  more	  –no	   less–	   than	   the	  counterpoint	  he	  
needs	   to	   be	   able	   to	   look	   at	   himself	   in	   the	   mirror.	   He	   looks	   at	   himself	   and,	   seeing	   his	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narration	   derail,	   his	   trust	   in	   himself,	   in	   his	   charm,	   his	   tenderness,	   his	   eloquence	   and	   his	  
social	  skills	  suddenly	  turns	  into	  an	  impression	  of	  his	  vanity,	  absurdity	  and	  conceit.	  	  
Helen	  Lynd	   implies	  something	   like	   this	  when	  she	  says	   that	  shame	  means	  a	   loss	  of	   trust	   in	  
oneself	  (in	  one’s	  life	  narrative)	  and,	  simultaneously,	   in	  the	  world,	  because	  both	  develop	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  and	  run	  parallel	  (Lynd	  1961,	  pp.	  43-­‐49).	  In	  such	  cases	  what	  comes	  to	  the	  fore	  
is	  subjectivity,	  the	  ability	  to	  analyse	  and	  criticise	  my	  own	  narration	  and	  my	  identity-­‐labels,	  
both	  those	  I	  receive	  from	  the	  outside	  and	  those	  I	  create	  for	  myself.	  There	  is	  the	  narration,	  
the	  life	  that’s	  being	  narrated	  and	  the	  narrator,	  the	  subject,	  who	  is	  only	  a	  co-­‐author	  of	  that	  
narration.	   This	   is	   precisely	   the	   difference	   between	   a	   narrated	   life	   and	   a	   fantasy:	   the	   first	  
must	   conform	   to	   the	   world	   and	   admit	   others	   as	   co-­‐authors	   if	   it	   is	   to	   be	   successful;	   the	  
second	   is	   unilaterally	   created	   by	   each	   one	   of	   us	   according	   to	   our	   fancy,	   unbound	   by	  
constrictions.	   Deep	   shame	   doesn’t	   (necessarily)	   alienate	   us	   from	   our	   past	   or	   from	   our	  
actions:	  it	  shows	  us	  that	  our	  narration	  needs	  to	  bring	  in	  the	  perspectives	  of	  others	  if	  it	  is	  to	  
be	  more	  than	  mere	  self-­‐fantasy,	  it	  shows	  us	  the	  limits	  of	  our	  authorial	  powers.	  
Of	   course	   shame	  can	  be	   completely	   inappropriate,	   fantasized	  and	   lacking	   in	  basis.	   I	   don’t	  
mean	  to	  imply	  that	  shame	  is	  the	  answer	  to	  how	  to	  bring	  the	  perspectives	  of	  others	  into	  our	  
life	  narratives,	  or	  that	  it	  can’t	  have	  a	  destructive	  side.	  Far	  from	  it.	  All	  I	  mean	  is	  that	  it	  carries	  
a	  sense	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  perspectives	  of	  others,	  which	  is	  crucial	  for	  our	  narrations.	  
Whether	  in	  each	  particular	  case	  the	  internalised	  other	  actually	  matches	  the	  real	  other	  in	  the	  
world	   is	   another	   matter.	   Also,	   shame	   is	   an	   important	   form	   of	   non-­‐empathic	   identity-­‐
preserving	  engagement	  with	  my	  past,	  which	  carries	  significant	  moral	  implications,	  because	  
it	  tells	  me	  that	  “this	  is	  me”,	  however	  much	  I	  might	  wish	  it	  weren’t.	   It	  preserves	  a	  sense	  of	  
responsibility.	  It	  makes	  me	  rethink	  myself.	  Again,	  whether	  one	  succumbs	  to	  the	  impulse	  of	  
escaping	  and	  hiding,	  as	   Lord	   Jim	  did,	  or	  one	  decides	   to	   face	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   is	  me	  and	   I	  
would	   like	   to	   change,	   is	   entirely	   another	   matter.	   The	   second	   option	   seems	   both	   better	  
suited	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  claims	  and	  more	  productive	  in	  terms	  of	  learning	  and	  
thinking	  about	  the	  future.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  agree	  with	  Goldie	  (2011)	  that	  we	  don’t	  always	  need	  
empathy,	   but	   the	   right	   emotional	   relation	   to	  our	   past,	  which	  may	   some	   times	  be	   shame.	  
This	   is	  why	   I	   agree	  with	  Williams	   (1993)	   that,	   by	   virtue	  of	   this	   connection	   to	   identity	   and	  
subjectivity,	   to	   the	   ability	   to	   reassess	   our	   past	   and	   rethink	   our	   future,	   shame	   has	   an	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